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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Huddled masses yearning to speak Russian? 
President Putin chose to address issues of immigration at the March 17 Security 
Council session; citing, in general terms, demographic data regarding Russia's 
population decline, including emigration figures, the president noted that "more 
than 100,000 scientists working inŠtraditionally strong sectors in Russia, such as 
mathematics, chemistry, physics and biology left the country between 1989 and 
2001. (1) 
 
Putin's partial solution is to encourage "regulated" immigration and to relieve 
some of the "chronic bureaucratic ailments" that take a particularly heavy toll on 
immigrants. (2) Putin's immigration recommendations were couched carefully in 
rhetoric meant to assuage concerns over illegal immigration, which is viewed as 
a fundamental cause for increases in violent crimes.  Unfortunately, violence, war 
and terrorism in the Caucasus have reinforced the dim general view of 
immigration, particularly from Russia's southern neighbors.  Putin however, used 
his Security Council remarks to suggest a reconsideration of the issue. 
 
Given Russia's declining population and the "brain drain" of the post-Soviet 
years, encouraging some forms of immigration could help to counter some of the 
effects of Russia's so-called 'demographic disaster' (Putin acknowledged his 
measures could not provide a true counterweight to declining population 
numbers).  What Putin presented to the Security Council was a recommendation 
that immigration to Russia be encouraged from the states of the former Soviet 
Union, where "practically all these people speak Russian and know Russian 
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culture." (3)  Putin raised the intriguing point that citizens of CIS states had little 
trouble "adapting to Russian life" (presumably because of the years of Soviet 
rule) and that Russia therefore was in a unique position to benefit from 
immigration (as opposed to Europe, where immigrants might take generations to 
adjust to European life).  Perhaps most interesting about Putin's remarks was the 
underlying theme that this was a realistic, perhaps even formidable, means of 
countering the centrifugal forces currently at work in the CIS; succinctly put, Putin 
proposed that Russia use its Soviet legacy to lure citizens of former SSRs in 
order to bind the NIS in a more tightly integrated union.  
 
There are several problems with this approach, but the two most glaring involve 
the internal contradiction that Russia is losing some of the most valuable 
members of its work force, but could convince workers from neighboring 
countries to immigrate (and face the daunting prejudices and bureaucratic 
hurdles).  That circle could only be squared by extreme economic distress in 
other CIS states (or perhaps civil strife), on which Russia would be positioned to 
capitalize.  But what occurs most remarkable in this presidential proposal to the 
Security Council is the "policy wonk" nature of Putin's proposition;  this doesn't 
appear to be the type of proposal that would occur instinctively to Putin, rather it 
sounds more like the result of a long, pessimistic conversation about the long 
term effects of democratic revolution in Georgia, Ukraine and perhaps other post-
Soviet states.  Somewhere deep in the Kremlin, some adviser to Putin found an 
elegant way to suggest that they just try making lemonade. 
 
Chubais assassination mystery? 
At the risk of sounding callous, the only mystery surrounding the attack on 
RAO/UES Chief Anatoli Chubais is why such an attack was not attempted years 
ago.  Which is just another was of asking, why now?  What has Chubais done 
lately, (I mean other than suggest that Mikhail Kasianov might be a viable 
appropriate successor to Vladimir Putin), that could possible make him 
vulnerable to an assassination attack? 
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While theories of motive, means and conspiratorial planning will overshadow any 
investigation of the attack, authorities do already have a suspect in custody.  
Vladimir Kvachkov, a 57 year old GRU spetsnaz veteran of Afghanistan and 
Chechnya (who reputedly set the snare that cost Shamil Basayev his leg) was 
detained based on an eyewitness description of a car seen speeding from the 
area.  A search of his automobile and home revealed some explosives (a stick of 
TNT or two grenades?) and a hunting rifle.  (4)   Initial reports claimed that 
Kvachkov rented a dacha near the Chubais dacha, and suggested the retired 
GRU officer was displeased about either the monetization of military officers' 
benefits or a minor traffic incident he had with Chubais some time earlier.  
 
Kvachkov quickly denied any involvement in the attack on Chubais and tried to 
correct some early media speculation (he is not a neighbor of Chubais, his car 
was in the area because he and his son had stopped at a local market, etc.), but 
he has stopped cooperating with authorities since learning that his son is now the 
"real" target of their investigation. (5)  Apparently, it didn't take much for this 
former General Staff official to understand that if he didn't want the honor of 
being made the scapegoat in this case, his son would be just as effective in the 
role. 
 
Chubais has announced that he knows who masterminded the attack, but, in 
truth, there is no upside to his naming the suspect.  As for Kvachkov, perhaps he 
and/or his son really were involved, perhaps he was just in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, or perhaps he was targeted intentionally to take the heat for an 
amateurish attack (why were he and his son sitting for so long near the scene?) 
in some obscure FSB/GRU battle.  There was one thing Chubais made clear:  
this was a political attack.  And that speaks volumes about the state of Russia's 
democracy. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) Introductory Remarks at the Security Council Meeting, 17 Mar 05 via 
(www.kremlin.ru). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Izvestiya, 21 Mar 05; What the Papers Say (WPS), 23 Mar 05 via Lexis-
Nexis; Vremya novostei, 21 Mar 05; WPS, 23 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis.  Reports of 
Kvachkov's career take him from Afghanistan to Germany to Chechnya and 
finally retiring from the General Staff, where he worked for a time in the civilian 
service.  Accounts differ on just what explosives/armaments might have been 
found during the search of Kvachkov's premises. 
(5) Interfax, 22 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
In televised remarks on the evening of 8 March, Federal Security Services (FSB) 
Director Nikolai Patrushev told President Vladimir Putin that FSB forces had 
killed Chechnya¹s rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov in the Chechen village of 
Tolstoy-Yurt.  (1)  Although reports of the event are not completely clear, it 
appears Maskhadov was killed in a ³bunker² in the basement of a house.  Initial 
reports claimed he was killed when FSB commandos threw a grenade into the 
bunker; later reports claimed he was shot.  (2)  The survival and capture of three 
of his aides, two notebook computers, and videotapes in the bunker appear to 
confirm the latter claim.  The customary conspiracy theories germinated within 
days as experts debated the presence or absence of wounds apparent in 
pictures of Maskhadov¹s body; government personnel refused to return 
Maskhadov¹s body to his family for burial, citing Russian laws regarding the 
disposition of terrorists; the house where he was reportedly killed was itself 
demolished by government agents some days a later; and a Moskovsky 
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komsomolets reporter, who inspected the  house before it was demolished, 
proclaimed the ventilation in the bunker inadequate for Maskhadov, much less 
his three-person entourage, to survive for any length of time.  (3)  What was not 
debated, however, was the fact that, circumstances notwithstanding, Aslan 
Maskhadov is dead. 
 
Maskhadov's death was met with predictable reactions.  President Putin praised 
the operation, and many officials in the pro-Moscow Chechen government and in 
Moscow saw the operation as a clear victory for Russian forces, having removed 
a very visible, if politically irrelevant, terrorist leader, and weakening the 
separatist movement.  (4)  They also took pride in the fact that Russia would pay 
the promised $10 million reward, a promise made following the Beslan siege for 
information that led to the capture or death of Maskhadov or Shamil Basayev, the 
more militant leader of the separatist Chechen forces who claimed credit for the 
Beslan take-over.  The reward recipients, however, were unnamed.  Stating 
gratuitously, "We know how to keep secrets," FSB spokesman Sergei 
Ignatchenko emphasized that anyone, from anywhere, who could provide 
Russian authorities with information that might lead to the capture or death of 
Basayev would also be paid and protected, by means ranging from physical 
relocation to plastic surgery.  (5)  Others, mostly outside the administration and 
the country, criticized the killing as having removed the one remaining legitimate 
Chechen political leader with whom some negotiated settlement with Moscow 
might be reached, despite Putin's repeated proclamations that Russia would 
never consider such negotiations.  Many of these same critics also saw this as 
clearing the way for Basayev to take control of the movement, further radicalizing 
the conflict.  (6) 
 
Some two weeks having passed since the assassination, the dearth of official 
commentary from the Kremlin, after the initial announcement, is curious.  There 
is some debate as to whether official guidance was to take Maskhadov dead or 
alive, and whether FSB forces followed this guidance.  Had Moscow wanted 
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Maskhadov taken captive for questioning and imprisonment, as Chechen deputy 
prime minister and de-facto head of state security Ramzan Kadyrov seems to 
have been told, and as Putin's regional envoy Dmitri Kozak understood (7), FSB 
forces clearly erred, but they appear to have done so precisely, without the use 
of overwhelming force that has become so typical of recent counter-terrorist 
operations in the region.  Indeed, such an operation involving tanks and 
flamethrowers would have provided easy cover for the FSB forces and would not 
have seemed unusual, given similar operations in Nalchik and Makhachkala.  
(See previous NIS Observed.)  Perhaps, then, it was not surprising that 
government forces later demolished the building where Maskhadov was killed.  
Were Maskhadov's death not the Kremlin's preferred outcome, one might have 
expected some official criticism regarding a botched operation, either leaked or in 
a government-influenced newspaper, or even from the Interior Ministry, itself 
evidently at odds with the FSB over control of counter-terror activities in the 
Caucasus.  Such internal criticism yet has to surface. 
 
If, on the other hand, the Kremlin was pleased with the manner in which events 
unfolded, one might have expected somewhat more official enthusiasm and a 
possible mention of specific units involved (especially the elite Alfa unit, had it 
been involved, given the losses it had received in counter-terror operations over 
the past few months), or even awards for bravery and an official statement 
broadcasting another victory against terror. However, given President Putin's visit 
to Europe, during which he spoke with French, German and Spanish leaders, he 
may have intended to mute the spectacle to avoid further criticism from E.U. 
member states, typically vocal critics of Russia's Chechnya policies.  (8)  If this 
was the case, and it appears the more likely possibility, look for more official 
praise in the weeks following Putin's return from Europe.   Also look for continued 
support for Kozak's planned federal guidance that the FSB will lead future 
counter-terror operations in and around Chechnya.  (See previous NIS 
Observed.) 
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From the Russian perspective, a couple of notable lessons are to be drawn from 
this event.  The first involves the use of Russian FSB forces in such a situation, 
without the assistance of regional Interior Ministry troops.  This fits with the 
previously discussed policy of de-Chechenization, whereby Kadyrov's troops and 
pro-Moscow Chechen government forces are slowly being removed from their 
security roles.  (9)  Ruslan Alkhanov, the Chechen Interior Minister, confirmed 
somewhat wryly that his forces were not involved:  "This was a unique operation, 
and we can only regret that Maskhadov was not killed by Interior Ministry staff."  
(10) Such a policy can leverage tips from the local population to locate individual 
government-targeted terrorists.  Conceivably, by removing the fear of retribution 
associated with divulging such information to other Chechens (even though they 
are putatively pro-Moscow forces), the use by the Kremlin of genuinely Russian 
special forces, along with a financial inducement of up to $10 million, can 
produce more public relations coups.  For these reasons, one may expect other 
such "FSB-only" operations to be stressed in the future. 
 
On the other hand, the Kremlin may also have taken note of the swift adaptation 
Chechen separatist forces have shown following Maskhadov's death.  Within 
days, and with unanimity by such disparate voices as former Maskhadov envoy, 
Akhmed Zakayev (on the Chechen Press website) and Shamil Basayev (on the 
Kavkaz Center website), the separatist movement hailed the previously little-
known Chechen Muslim cleric Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev as Maskhadov's 
successor. (11)  According to Zakayev, the decision to appoint him the heir 
apparently was made as early as 2002. (12)  This should be cause for concern 
for Russian counter-terrorist forces.  That the rebel force was able to announce 
the new leader so quickly and with no observable disagreement reflects a well-
ordered and well-led structure.  Far from sending the separatists into disarray, 
Maskhadov's death showed the Chechen movement, thought by some to have 
fractured into radical Basayev-led elements and less radical Maskhadov-led 
groups (13), to be speaking with a single voice, promoting a replacement leader 
without a ripple. Additionally, that this organization can select and promote a 
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virtual unknown into this post apparently without drawing any attention from the 
intelligence elements within the FSB or the Interior Ministry is even more 
noteworthy. Basayev himself was expected to lead the rebellion after 
Maskhadov's death, or possibly the "radical warlord" Doku Umarov (14), but 
expectations by outsiders were clearly off the mark. That no one saw 
Sadulayev's rise to leadership, a decision apparently made nearly three years 
ago, not to mention the fact that it apparently took Russian forces this long to 
locate Maskhadov (and still they cannot locate Basayev, essentially public enemy 
number one), means that Russia's counter-guerrilla forces, the FSB and MVD, 
have significant work to do to build an intelligence network with any hope of 
keeping up with the insurgents.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Catherine Belton and Valeria Korchagina, "Maskhadov Declared Dead in FSB 
Sweep," The Moscow Times, 9 Mar 05, p.1. 
(2) "What Happened in the Maskhadov Raid," BBC News, 15 Mar 05 via 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/4330393.stm). 
(3) Musa Sadulayev "Maskhadov House Is Demolished," The Moscow Times, 15 
Mar 05, p. 2; "Russia Pays 10 Million Dollars For Info On Slain Chechen Leader, 
" Agence France Presse, 15 Mar 05 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #9091, 15 
Mar 05; and Vadim Rechkalov and Irina Kuksenkova "Ramzan Kadyrov's Slip of 
The Tongue," Moskovsky Komsomolets, 15 Mar 05; What the Papers Say – 
Defense and Security, 16 Mar 05, via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(4) Simon Saradzhyan, "Kremlin's Victory May Be Short-lived," The Moscow 
Times, 10 Mar 05, p. 1. 
(5) "Plastic Surgery To Those Who Give Up Hardline Chechen Rebel: FSB," 
Agence France Presse, 16 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Saradzhyan, ibid, and "Officials Deny Chechen Leader Was Eliminated In 
Cold Blood," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 48, Part I, 14 
Mar 05. 
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(7) Belton and Korchagina, ibid. 
(8) Anatoly Medetsky, "Rebels Promise to Carry on Fighting," The Moscow 
Times, 10 Mar 05, p. 1. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Belton and Korchagina, ibid. 
(11) Carl Schreck, "Cleric Is Picked As Rebel Leader," The Moscow Times, 11 
Mar 05, p. 1.  
(12) Olga Allenova, "'We Were Idealists Rather Than Realists':  An Interview with 
Akhmed Zakayev, Ex-Emissary of Aslan Maskhadov," Kommersant-VLAST, No. 
10, Mar 05, via JRL #9091, 15 Mar 05. 
(13) Pavel Felgenhauer, "Rebel Will Not Rest In Peace," The Moscow Times, 15 
Mar 05, p. 13. 
(14) Saradzhyan, ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
An ongoing dispute 
The announcement that Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi would not be 
attending the VE-Day celebrations to be held in Moscow in May, which coincided 
with President Putin's apparent decision not to visit Japan this spring, has made 
evident the strain in Russo-Japanese relations. Although efforts have been made 
in recent months to secure a stronger strategic relationship, including the 
December agreement on an oil pipeline running from Russia to the Pacific port of 
Nakhodka to assist Japan¹s energy needs (December), Moscow waits for Japan 
to make concessions on their main point of contention: the four southernmost 
Kuril Islands (the ³Northern Territories²) and Japan awaits Russian concession 
on the same point. 
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In November 2004, Putin returned to the 1956 joint Soviet-Japanese declaration, 
offering Japan two of the disputed four islands; there was speculation that Putin 
might compromise over the other two islands, but no further progress has been 
made. (1) February marked the 150th anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan and a resolution was made in the 
upper and lower houses of the Japanese Diet calling for the return of the 
³Northern Territories,² vague wording that has caused Moscow concern. (2) Until 
1956, the Japanese government claimed the entire Kuril Archipelago, as well as 
the southern half of Sakhalin Island; these claims have been rescinded by the 
government but remain an issue for the Japanese Communist Party. Members of 
the Japanese Diet have told Moscow that the resolution¹s wording was 
purposefully vague to appease the Communist Party and get their vote. 
 
Clearly, Japan remains conflicted on issues pertaining to World War II, with 
territorial disputes taking center stage (China, South Korea, as well as Russia). 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is scheduled to visit Japan in late May to 
³coordinate arrangements for a Russian-Japanese summit and step up efforts to 
produce tangible results,² but should these issues not be resolved and remain in 
the forefront of Russian-Japanese interactions, their growing bilateral strategic 
and energy relations will surely suffer. (3) The misunderstandings of the past 
might continue to plague the future. 
 
A burst of energy 
Russia continues to increase economic ties with China, specifically in the energy 
sphere. This year, Russia plans to double its electric power deliveries to China to 
about 500 million kWt/hrs. This is an increase from the 300 million delivered in 
2004, and it is set to grow further in 2006 (to 800 million kWt/hrs).  Oil exports by 
rail are also set to rise to 10 million tons in 2005 and 15 million tons in 2006. (4) 
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This arrangement clearly will suit China's growing energy needs. China also 
needs Russia as a market for the goods produced by its rapidly increasing 
economy. Bilateral trade could surge to $60-80 billion by 2010. In turn, this 
economic relationship could benefit Russia politically, giving it a possible edge 
over the United States and the EU. (5) 
 
Commercial or military significance? 
Following the Bratislava summit with President Bush, President Putin signed a 
deal with Iran to provide nuclear fuel for Iran¹s Bushehr nuclear power plant. This 
generated widespread concern internationally, especially in Washington, where 
Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman went so far as to call for Russia¹s 
exclusion from this year¹s G-8 summit. (6) Putin's response to critics is to insist 
that this deal with Iran has no military significance and simply represents an 
alternative energy source, but explanation strains credulity. (7) Britain, France 
and Germany continue to put together incentives in an attempt to persuade Iran 
to abandon its uranium enrichment project, but Moscow insists on following 
through with the deal. Igor Ivanov, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, 
perhaps hoping to comfort critics (stated that in Russia), there are no ³such crazy 
people to help anyone to create nuclear weapons² that might end up in the hands 
of terrorists. (8) 
 
Even if Bushehr could be entirely transparent, its very existence provides 
valuable expertise concerning nuclear technology and gives Iran ³an entry ticket 
to a nuclear Œclub.¹² (9) Such assistance to Iran gives Russia a troublesome 
wedge in a troubled region. Though some have suggested that this recent deal 
benefits Russia more in economic than in political terms, the public price tag on 
Bushehr is just about $900 million, ³barely one-third of the money the Nunn-
Lugar program spent over ten years on securing Russia¹s own nuclear arsenal.² 
(10) Though money talks, it seems that in this situation, power and influence 
have the upper hand. 
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Among friends 
On 18 March, President Putin joined the leaders of France, Germany and Spain 
to discuss ways to bolster EU-Russia ties. The primary aim of this informal 
summit was to restore ³a climate of confidence and also for the three Western 
leaders to extend a friendly hand to Putin² and to ³encourage him down the road 
of political and economic reforms.² (11) The European leaders clearly believe it is 
in their best interest to attempt a greater integration with Russia, and the EU 
wants to conclude talks with Russia regarding the four ³common spaces² by 
2007. A matter on Putin¹s agenda was to win commitments from the three 
leaders to attend the World War Two victory day celebrations in Moscow on 9 
May. (12)  
 
President Putin¹s arrival in Paris marked the first time a foreign leader has ever 
visited the Air Force operative center located just outside of the city; he also went 
with President Chirac to the Elysee Palace where Russian writers participated in 
the Paris Book Fair. (13) 
 
To the moon! 
It looks as though the European space exploration plan will eclipse national 
programs; France and Russia signed an agreement on the joint development of 
new launch vehicles and manned space missions. Russian-European 
cooperation on space launch options could generate an array of new ideas and 
approaches to space exploration. (14) Europe is considering phasing out its 
Arianne-5 workhorse and a new rocket is set to be developed with Russia; the 
first Russian-European launch vehicle should take off in 2020. (15) 
 
Turned down? 
Finance Ministers from the Group of Seven (G-7) have said they will reject 
Russia¹s bid to become a full member of the G-7, saying that as the world¹s 16th 
largest economy ($533 billion), Russia is not big enough to justify membership. 
(16) Russia is supposed to chair the Group of Eight (G-8) most politically 
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powerful governments in 2006 and traditionally, the country chairing the G-8 also 
chairs the G-7. Vito Tanzi, Undersecretary of Finance for Italy from 2001-2003 
said, ³The G-7 will work hard to keep others out.² (17)  These ³others² would 
include China, which is already larger than Canada (a G-7 member). Germany 
has supported Russia¹s membership in the G-7 and Jim O¹Neill of Goldman 
Sachs Group in London believes that, ³At a financial level, it is quite ridiculous 
not to include China at a minimum, and there is a very good case to consider 
having Russia, India and Brazil, too.² (18) But perhaps there are reasons beyond 
economics why Russia¹s bid might be rejected. Stuart Eizenstat, who served 
under President Clinton, stated, ³Pushing for G-7 status is a great stretch for 
Russia, as it simply doesn¹t deserve itŠRussia¹s economy is too small and isn¹t 
free enough to merit membership, and it has drifted on democracy and reform.² 
(19) Russia¹s democratic failures seem to strike again. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol 2, issue 49, 11 Mar 05; www.euraisadaily.org 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) RIA novosti, 18 Mar 05, 12:05 via (http://en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm). 
(4) Moscow News via CDI Russia Weekly, 18 Mar 05, #21. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Moscow Times via CDI Russia Weekly, 11 Mar 05, #12. 
(7) Eurasia Daily Monitor via CDI Russia Weekly, vol 2, issue 43, 3 Mar 05, #25. 
(8) RIA novosti, 18 Mar 05, 15:59 via (http://en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm). 
(9) Eurasia Daily Monitor via CDI Russia Weekly, vol 2, issue 43 3 Mar 05, #25. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) EurActiv.com, 18 Mar 05; (www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-136912-
16&type=News). 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) RIA novosti, 18 Mar 05, 13:13 via (http://en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm). 
(14) RIA novosti, 18 Mar 05, 16:31 via (http://en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm).. 
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(15) Ibid. 
(16) Moscow Times via CDI Russia Weekly, 11 Mar 05, #12. 
(17) Ibid. 
(18) Ibid. 
(19) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Gubernatorial shenanigans 
On March 9, President Vladimir Putin removed the governor of the Koryak 
Autonomous Area, Vladimir Loginov, from his post, and appointed Boris 
Zolotarev as the new regional leader. Ostensibly, Loginov was fired for failing to 
provide an adequate fuel supply for his region in the midst of winter. Loginov¹s 
deputy Mikhail Sokolovsky is facing criminal charges for mishandling the fuel 
supplies. 
 
Loginov was elected to his second term in April 2004. This is the first time that 
Putin has used his newly legislated power to remove a governor, and it helps 
clarify a point of ambiguity in the new law: Putin has demonstrated that he can 
(and will) fire governors who were popularly elected, not just regional leaders 
appointed under the new system. 
 
Putin does not appear to be picking fights haphazardly, however. On March 15, 
he reappointed Mintimer Shaymiyev as president of the republic of Tatarstan. 
This decision reflects an unwillingness to engage in action that could prove 
politically damaging for Putin. Tatarstan has struggled vigorously and doggedly 
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for its autonomy since the early 1990s, and Shaymiyev has been one of the most 
vocal critics of Putin's move to appoint regional leaders. 
 
Had Putin appointed a different candidate, he faced the possibility that 
Tatarstan's regional legislature would reject his appointment. Failure to confirm a 
presidential appointment, after three votes, can result in the dissolution of the 
legislature and new parliamentary elections. If Putin had appointed a candidate 
and dissolved the legislature in the face of continued resistance, he would have 
run the risk that the Tartar voters would return the same legislators. This scenario 
would have proven a great political embarrassment for Putin and would cast 
doubt on his ability to select viable candidates. 
 
As it is, Putin¹s appointments and removals have some governors taking 
defensive measures. Konstantin Titov, head of the Samara region since 1991, 
found himself in a precarious position in mid-March. He expected demonstrations 
to protest Samara¹s economic conditions to occur on March 12-14. Anticipating 
these rallies (and probably mindful of Liginov¹s fate), Titov issued a statement on 
the protests, claiming that their intent was to ³turn the governor into 'their own 
man' who will protect the interests of financial-industrial groups exclusively...² (1) 
 
Titov¹s preemptive attempts to divert blame from himself may be emulated by 
regional leaders as they adjust to the president¹s new powers. Although Putin 
seems hesitant to tangle with powerful ethnic leaders such as Shaymiyev, the 
dismissal of Loginov has established a clear precedent for other governors. 
 
It is possible that Putin would be more hesitant to fire someone that he has 
appointed personally because it might reflect on his ability to choose competent 
governors. However, the removal of a popularly elected governor by presidential 
decision makes the current position of regional leaders very precarious. While it 
might be prudent to request presidential reappointment early in order to secure 
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presidential favor, a governor's request for early appointment also might be seen 
as a timely opportunity for the president to replace him. 
 
Duma acknowledging limits of sovereignty 
The Duma rejected a bill, proposed by the Rodina faction, which would facilitate 
the incorporation of autonomous regions of former Soviet republics within the 
Russian Federation. The bill¹s authors said, ³Šin view of the lately increasing 
attempts of some states, namely the former Soviet republics of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova, to extend their sovereignty to the territories of the 
unrecognized republics of Abkhazia, Adjaria, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the Dniestr Moldovan Republic, it is particularly timely today to assess the 
legality and juridical validity of such claims." (2)  
 
There are several objections to the bill¹s reasoning. First, Russia acknowledged 
the borders of the other former union republics during the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. Second, since Russia has recognized these republics, followed by 
the international community, allowing the autonomies to join Russia would be a 
clear infringement on the sovereignty of those states (i.e. Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and Moldova) and a violation of international law. Russia already is politically and 
militarily involved in areas such as the breakaway region of Abkhazia in Georgia, 
and while these actions themselves may be construed as violating Georgian 
territorial sovereignty, the passage of this proposed law would leave no doubt. 
 
The bill received only 91 of the 300 votes it needed to pass, signaling that, 
however willing the Duma might be to enlarge Russia's territory; it is hesitant, at 
this stage, to issue an open challenge to the international community. 
 
Or perhaps the Duma hasn¹t grasped the concept of sovereignty 
The State Duma is preparing a communication to the Georgian parliament to 
challenge Georgia¹s objections to the continued presence of Russian military 
bases on Georgian soil. Russia Defense Committee chief Viktor Zavarzin 
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denounced the "categorical tone for the Georgian president that sanctions will be 
used against Russia if concrete dates of the withdrawal of the Russian bases 
from the Georgian territories are not set." (3)  The Russian bases already have 
exceeded the initial terms of the agreement between Russia and Georgia; thus, 
Georgia has a sovereign right to demand the removal of the bases. Although the 
Duma still hesitates to accept other countries' autonomous regions into the 
Russian Federation, perhaps it has not learned the true definition of sovereignty 
after all. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Samara governor's concerns over impending demonstrations, reappointment 
prospects examined,² Izvestiya, 14 Mar 05 via World News Connection (WNC). 
(2) ³Duma rejects bill on new autonomies joining Russian Federation,² Itar-Tass, 
11 Mar 05 via WNC. 
(3) ³Russia[n] Duma preparing address to Georgian parliament about bases,² 
Itar-Tass, 15 Mar 05 via WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak 
 
The Armed Forces and the war on terror 
Unlike the U.S., Russia has not published a single document outlining their 
strategy for combating terrorism.  However, with only a cursory survey of official 
statements made by high-level government officials and by reviewing policies 
taken in the name of the war against terrorism, a reasonably clear picture 
emerges as the basic Russian strategy.  Defense Minster Sergei Ivanov stated in 
December 2004 that "I have many times stated that a war has been declared to 
us, and when at war behave like it is a war." (1)  In September 2004, Chief of the 
Russian General Staff, Col-Gen Yuri Baluyevsky said that Moscow is prepared to 
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deliver preemptive strikes at terrorist bases no matter where they are located.  
Confirmed on numerous occasions later by Ivanov, the Russian's declared 
preemptive strike posture has generated debate not only in regards to the legality 
of such a policy, but also as to the targets that might be struck and the means 
with which Russia would strike them.  Leaving the issues of legality and targets 
aside, a question rises as to the capability of the Russian armed forces to project 
power outside of the Russian borders in a strike supporting national objectives in 
the battle against terrorism. 
 
Leonid Ivashov, the vice-president of the Academy for Geopolitical Problems, 
thinks that the threat of pre-emptive strikes is, "A highly dangerous statement!  
Dangerous because it is a complete bluff, out of touch with the realities and 
utterly presumptuousŠ. Knowing the situation in the armed forces, I can make 
the claim that we have no means of applying either strategic or operational 
pressure on terrorists." (2)  Ivashov blames the General Staff for not properly 
equipping the army.  "To investigate, for example, why a mobile infantry regiment 
did not go to the aid of the lawful authorities and the populace when gunmen 
attached Nazran.  The story is that it was because of the shortage of batteries for 
its armored vehicles." (3)  This statement is in line with most observers' general 
assessment of the Russian armed forces and supports the idea that the Chief of 
the General Staff and Defense Minister are bluffing.  However, when directly 
confronted with the question as to the credibility of the threat, Ivanov responded, 
"These are not political declarations.  We really will carry out preventive 
strikesŠ.We have high-precision weapons, we have spetsnaz troops." (4) 
 
Reaching out and touching terrorists 
Instead of simply being dismissive, one should examine the facts.  Ivanov 
mentioned "high-precision weapons."  High precision weapons capable of striking 
targets outside of Russia most likely would have to be launched/released from an 
aircraft.  According to the Russian Air Force Chief of Staff, Col-Gen Boris 
Cheltsov, "Today our long-range aviation has high-precision long-range weapons 
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which enables it to find terrorists anywhere in the world and inflict on them the 
damage they deserve." (5)  Notwithstanding the unlikelihood that the weapons he 
spoke of actually could assist in "finding" the terrorists (one should know where 
the terrorists are before employing the weapon), Cheltsov's claim that some of 
Russia's Soviet-era cruise missiles have been modified to carry a conventional 
warhead is widely accepted.  The Kh‑555 cruise missile (modified version of the 
nuclear-armed Kh-55) can be carried by the 1950's vintage, turbo prop, Tu-95 
Bear as well as the 1980's vintage, supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack strategic 
bombers.  Test firing of these weapons/platform mixes were accomplished most 
recently in Spring 2004. (6)  The Air Force is scheduled to receive two additional 
(one new and one refurbished) Blackjacks in 2005 to bring their total to 15, in 
addition to an unspecified number of modified cruise missiles.  The Air Force also 
should begin receiving the new Kh‑101 conventional cruise missile in early 2005.  
The Kh‑101 is said to have a 600kg conventional warhead, an intercept-defeating 
radar cross section of 0.01m2, a range of approximately 5,000 km , and a 
predicted accuracy of between 6 and 20 meters.  The missile, however, still relies 
on a terrain reference system for en route navigation and a televisual system for 
terminal guidance.  This means that it has limited capability at night or in poor 
weather. (7)  The other platform capable of delivering precision weapons over a 
substantial distance is the Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber.  The Russian Air Force has 
66 updated Backfires still in their inventory.  The Backfire, with a nominal combat 
radius of 1,300 miles, is said to have enjoyed more success than the older frontal 
aviation aircraft in the second Chechnya campaign thanks to its updated fire 
control system, flexibility in weapons load, and all weather capability. (8) 
 
The combinations of heavy bombers with cruise missiles, and medium range 
bombers with precision guided munitions (PGM), sound like a formidable strike 
force.  The reality is, however, that Russia's inventory of PGMs is woefully 
lacking.  Similar to the cruise missile mentioned above, Russia's PGMs are not 
GPS guided but rather they rely on laser or electro-optical guidance, which 
reduces their utility in bad weather.  In addition to hardware shortfalls, the chronic 
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funding shortages over the past 15 years have resulted in a fairly low level of 
readiness of pilots and maintenance crews in nearly all flying units.  It is this 
reality that accounts for the fact that 10 out of the 11 Russian Air Force combat 
aircraft lost in mishaps in 2003 crashed due to "human factors"—violations of 
regulations either intentionally or due to a lack of training.  Although averages 
don't tell the whole story, Russian bomber pilots averaged less than 40 hours per 
year (compared with more than 200 hours per year for their U.S. counterparts). 
(9)  The complexity of a mission employing precision weapons requires 
significantly more training than would be available to the average pilot.  The long 
range aviation of the Air Force is obviously not in any position to carry out 
sustained combat operations.  However, a handful of bomber pilots undoubtedly 
receive more training than average and are more capable of executing 
operational strikes.  Considering that one Tu-160 can carry up to 12 of the 
modern Kh-101 (more than is likely in the inventory at present), it wouldn't take 
more than a couple planes to do real damage to point targets in a terrorist haven. 
 
Sneaking up on terrorists 
Ivanov also mentioned the possibility that Russia would use spetsnaz to conduct 
preemptive strikes.  While several of Russia's power structures have special 
force units attached to them, what Ivanov likely was referring to was the special 
designation forces assigned to the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate 
(GRU), known as spetsnaz.  Spetsnaz brigades, 2,000 men strong, are assigned 
to the intelligence directorates of each of the 7 military districts and each of the 4 
fleets.  Within each brigade, there are several 200-man commando units that 
actually do the work. (10)  Specializing in small team operations, these 
commando units were trained to carry out local missions like reconnaissance or 
sabotage in the enemy's rear area, or capturing key infrastructure (like NATO 
tactical nuclear weapons sites) or beachheads in advance of the main forces.  
However, it became apparent during the first Chechen campaign that the 
spetsnaz units were the only truly battle worthy units left in the army.  For this 
reason, they were used for any number of missions outside of their designed 
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specialty, including storming cities and conducting defensive actions.  Today, 
although most units are still manned primarily with conscripts, the spetsnaz retain 
considerable capability.  To maximize their capacity, there is current discussion 
about combining all the spetsnaz units under a single command with the creation 
of a new "Special Purpose Forces" segment of the armed forces.  Under the 
current force configuration, attempting to combine the efforts of multiple units 
requires overcoming significant bureaucratic obstacles that exist between the 
Defense Ministry and the military districts.  By creating a separate command for 
special purpose forces, training and operational planning and employment 
become much more standardized and efficient. (11)  
 
Should this new branch of the armed forces be created by the Security Council, it 
will be very important to distinguish the roles and missions of the new arm from 
that of the Airborne Troops.  The Airborne Troops represent one of the few truly 
capable elements of the Russian armed forces.  With more than 30,000 troops 
organized into 5 airborne divisions, eight airmobile assault landing brigades, and 
other special units including a spetsnaz unit, the airborne troops are the best 
equipped, best trained troops in the Russian army.  The premier airborne division 
is the 76th Pskov Guards division.  Nearly a third of this elite division, now 
manned completely by contract soldiers, have just returned from deployment to 
Chechnya during which they were responsible for closing up rebel transit routes 
and safe havens in the mountainous region of southern Chechnya, doing so with 
some acknowledged success. (12)  Having returned home, the 76th is readying 
itself for a fast-paced exercise schedule.  In 2005, Russia will conduct joint 
military exercises with the forces of India, Uzbekistan, China and Germany.  The 
76th will participate in all these exercises, not only putting Russia's best side 
forward in the international arena, but also providing that unit invaluable 
experience operating in various terrain and combat environments. (13)  
 
Summary 
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As capable as the airborne troops might be, they still suffer from some serious 
deficiencies.  The professionalization of the 76th has proved that this process 
alone will not fix the discipline and crime problems that plague nearly all of the 
armed forces. (See previous NIS observed.)  Equipment modernization, while 
picking up speed as defense budgets soar and procurement increases, still lags 
even in these elite units.  The limits placed on training and operational 
deployments by the lack of funding for fuel, aircraft maintenance, and aircrew 
training, has the biggest impact on the total capability represented in the form of 
the Airborne Troops. (14)  Execution of last summer's major anti-terrorism 
exercise, Mobility-2004, which required the movement of  800 airborne troops 
from Pskov to the Far East, took the combined effort of the military's airlift 
capability as well as civilian airliners to accomplish.  The Defense Ministry started 
saving fuel for this exercise months in advance.  According to then-chief of 
combat training for the armed forces, Col-Gen Alexander Skorodumov, "At 
present the Russian army needs over a month to transport 800 servicemen to the 
Far East.  We had to use civil jetlinersŠ.Our troopers could not return to the base 
for two months because we did not have enough fuel." (15)  The Russian military 
surely would struggle to move and sustain a force of significant size any distance 
to accomplish even a modest objective. 
 
Although the armed forces are not without some capability to accomplish an 
international strike, thanks to outdated weapon systems and low rates of total 
force readiness, the Russian armed forces are really only capable of achieving 
limited objectives over a short period of time.  A strike would most likely take the 
form of a cruise missile attack from a 4-ship of bombers, a limited assault across 
border from a formation of airborne troops, or a covert spetsnaz mission abroad 
against a very small objective.  In all cases, there would be huge political risks 
associated, varying greatly with target selection and perceived legitimacy of the 
strike, which would result in little operational gain given the sum total of forces 
that could be brought to bear. 
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More to the story? 
There are some who think that the government's tough military talk with 
reference to the war on terror has objectives beyond threatening terrorists.  
According to one analyst, "the Russians are seeking to rationalize their continued 
commitment to maintaining an arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons fit 
for a superpower by rolling them into the global war on terrorism," and that "the 
Russians continue to use the language of the global war on terrorism to justify 
their wider program of rearmament." (16)  The validity of this analysis becomes 
clearer when you consider the views of Ivanov with regards to the role of the 
armed forces in the war on terror and foreign relations in general.  Back in June 
of 2004, the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta made the observation of 
Mobility-2004 that it was a "somewhat strange" way to exercise a counter-terror 
operation.  The paper quoted Ivanov agreeing that launching a large-scale 
operation against terrorist was like "beating off mosquitoes with a hammer." (17)  
Clearly, Ivanov was not a big supporter of fashioning a military to do simple anti-
terrorist missions.  Subsequently Ivanov has had to back pedal, claiming that he 
didn't mean that the armed forces shouldn't be used in the war on terror.  It is 
very unclear what he did mean then.  The reality is that the Defense Ministry is 
still very focused on the military's role in great power politics, not its role in law 
enforcement activities domestically.  Ivanov sees the world like this: "Nobody has 
put it better that (Tsar) Aleksandr III.  As before, we have two allies, the army and 
the navyŠ.the reliable defense of our sovereignty can be ensured only by a 
strong army and navy and an effective economy." (18)  Ivanov believes that 
although Russia prefers to use political, diplomatic and other non-military means 
to protect its interests, Russia must possess a sufficient military to make this 
protection effective. (19)  Ivanov's understanding of the need for a strong military 
is slightly different from those within the defense establishment who still see the 
U.S. as the real threat to Russia.  Subtle words uttered by high ranking general 
officers, think tank specialists, and journalists make this very clear:  While 
discussing the test of newly modified air-launched cruise missiles, Major-General 
Anatoly Zhikharev, commander of the 22nd Air Division, comments that "A Tu-
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95MS carries six missiles.  It takes six to eight missiles to destroy an aircraft 
carrier;" (20); Leonid Ivashov says that "Russia is surrounded by a network of 
military bases, and NATO aircraft patrol the length of Russia's bordersŠ.Yet the 
defense minister and the General Staff never tire of reiterating that they see no 
threat to Russia's security;" (21)  Explaining his perception of the Defense 
Ministry's thinking regarding Russian military exercises with Germany, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta author Vladimir Mukhin states "Ten years ago, Russian 
troops withdrew from East Germany.  Now there is a training war again.  
Germany is the main opponent of the United States within NATO, so it is 
necessary to be friends with Germany as well." (22)  Clearly reforming and 
reequipping the Russian military will increase its capability to combat the terrorist 
threat at home and possibly accomplish strikes abroad.  Just as clearly, however, 
the Russian perception of the role of military power and the nature of its enemies 
doesn't stop with international terrorism.  Russia seems to understand that 
cooperating with the West is vital to the growth of its economy and that the 
economy is central to achieving some level of greatness.  Its current strategy of 
using the cover of the war on terror to build its military capability allows Russia to 
continue its drive for re-attaining great power military status, focused on 
balancing the U.S., while at the same time, appearing to be an ally in the war on 
terror.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Remarks by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Discussing the State 
of the Russian Military, 10 Dec 2004," Federal News Service, 13 Dec 04 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) "Russia's Threat of Pre-Emptive Strikes Exposes it to Greater Danger," 
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Markets. 
(3) Ibid. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
MOLDOVA 
Parliamentary elections results 
The results of the Moldovan parliamentary elections were validated by the 
Constitutional Court last week. Almost sixty-five percent of eligible voters cast 
ballots. According to the final results, the Communist Party won 46 percent of the 
vote, the centrist Democratic Moldova Bloc (BDM) 28.5 percent, and the right-
wing Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD) obtained 9.07 percent of the 
vote. None of the other parties managed to poll above the 6 percent threshold.  
As a result, in the new parliament, the Communist party will hold 56 out of 101 
seats, the BDM 34 and the PPCD 11 seats. (1) 
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The number of seats gained by the Communists will allow them to form the 
government and parliamentary bodies on their own (for which a simple majority 
of 52 seats is required), but they will not have enough votes (61) to elect the 
president. This suggests at least two possible scenarios: First, the opposition 
parties can boycott all three attempts to elect the president, thus forcing new 
parliamentary elections to take place earlier than scheduled; second, several 
parliamentary members from the opposition parties might defect and vote for the 
Communist president. Since the voting will be secret, the only way to stop the 
³deserters² will be to boycott the parliamentary meetings. It is doubtful, however, 
that either of the opposition parties will resort to this step. The chances are also 
extremely slim that the opposition will unite to force new parliamentary elections, 
which leaves a (temporary) alliance with the Communists the only realistic 
scenario for opposition members. 
 
Why did the Communists win? 
During these parliamentary elections, President Vladimir Voronin managed to 
play both domestic and foreign relations cards well, thus appealing to the needs 
and interests of a wide audience and assuring his party¹s parliamentary victory. 
 
Voronin's electoral strategy apparently involved solidifying the Communist's base 
support, while launching a moderate non-threatening political platform. The pro-
communist electorate consists mainly of middle-aged and elderly people, and 
many voters appreciated the fact that the current authorities paid attention to 
their needs and increased their pensions and salaries. This, apparently, was 
enough for people to close their eyes to the Communists¹ numerous abuses of 
power during the last four years, to forget the opposition protests, journalists¹ 
hunger strikes, and attempts to block democratic development in the country.  
 
Second, the cardinal change in the Communists¹ political direction appealed both 
to the domestic electorate and Western politicians. Even though almost all 
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parties running for this election had similar political programs (emphasizing pro-
Western, pro-EU direction), the Communist Party was the most persuasive. In 
addition, Voronin¹s post-election visit to Kiev, as well as the unexpected 
appearance in Moldova of Georgian¹s Rose revolution leader, Mikhail 
Saakashvilli, reinforced Voronin¹s image as a reformed pro-European leader. 
 
Now that the electoral campaign is over and the Communist party won the 
majority of the parliamentary seats, it is yet to be seen if Voronin will stay faithful 
to his campaign promises. 
 
BELARUS 
By-elections in Belarus 
A by-election in the No. 52 Hrodna Tsentralny election district to fill the only 
vacant seat in the House of Representatives took place this week. President 
Lukashenko, as expected, was not planning to give up this last parliamentary 
seat to the opposition, even to provide the appearance of democracy.  The 
government-backed candidate, Syarhey Maskevich, rector of Hrodna State 
University, was not too embarrassed to state that he was absolutely certain of his 
future victory: ³I believe I stand a 100 percent chance of winning the vote.²  (2) 
The two opposition candidates were certain from the start that they had no 
chance of winning these elections: ³How can one comment on the elections 
when the electoral legislation is being amended on the go and deputies of local 
councils are expelled form polling stations in accordance with these 
amendments?² said Syarhey Antusevich of the Belarusian People¹s Front. (3) 
Polish journalists attempting to cover provincial elections were detained and 
thrown into jail. 
 
UKRAINE 
Putin¹s visit to Kiev 
The second official visit of the Russian President to Kiev (19 March), following 
Yushschenko¹s election was more amiable than the first.  Despite unpleasant 
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memories of Putin¹s support for Yushschenko¹s opponent, the visit proceeded 
smoothly, and Putin concluded that problems between Ukraine and Russia 
³simply do not exist.² (4) Nonetheless, the Russian president had many reasons 
to be apprehensive about the ambiance of this visit. Russia¹s possible 
involvement in Yushchenko¹s poisoning, the issue of potential re-privatization of 
Russian assets in Ukraine, as well as Boris Nemtsov¹s connection with the new 
Ukrainian government already have caused tension between the leaders. 
 
Putin was remarkably open to Ukraine¹s rapprochement with the E.U.  At his 
meeting with the leaders of France, Germany and Spain, Putin said that ³Russia 
welcomes Ukraine¹s broadening cooperation with the E.U., as it corresponds to 
our interests. (5) Russia may well have been left with little choice but to support 
Ukraine's course following Putin's failed attempts to influence the Ukrainian 
elections; a pro-E.U., supportive approach to Ukraine was the only road to follow 
that would circumvent criticism. 
 
Despite those in Ukraine who do not want to see their country join the Common 
Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, Yushchenko spoke in 
favor of creating a free trade zone, which would be a step towards joining the 
CES. Yushchenko¹s outlook was a clear indication that alienating his neighbor 
was not in his plans. 
 
The Ukrainian-Russian border was another sensitive issue. If Yushchenko is 
serious about Ukraine joining the European Union, the borders in the Azov Sea, 
Black Sea and Kertch Strait should be settled before the negotiations can start. 
Putin reassured Yushchenko by saying that ³the necessary agreement will be 
achieved given the will on both sides.² (6) 
 
While Putin¹s visit proceeded in a friendly atmosphere, it did not result in any 
breakthroughs. One can say, however, that the fact that both presidents had 
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enough wisdom at least publicly, to put the ordeal of the past Ukrainian 
presidential elections behind them and adapt to the realities left in their wake. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(4) Interfax news agency, 21 Mar 05; Diplomatic Panorama via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) RIA novosti, 21 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
CHECHNYA 
The Disappeared 
³I thought they were taking my son away.  I ran and shouted, ŒWhere are you 
taking him?¹ I couldn¹t really see. Š But the children started crying, ŒThey are 
taking mommy away!¹ Š I ran up with her passport, but they did not take it. Š 
They just dragged her away.² (1) 
 
The above statement is from the mother of 37-year-old Chechen, Khalimat 
Sadulaeva.  The mother of four was taken from her home in Argun on September 
12, 2004 by forces believed to represent either local pro-Moscow Chechen 
authorities or Russian Internal Affairs or Defense units.  Sadulaeva has not been 
seen since.  It is unknown why she may have been targeted; security forces in 
the republic claim they are not holding her and her family can find no information 
on her case.   She simply has become one of the Chechen ³disappeareds.² 
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On March 21, Human Rights Watch released a 57-page report examining the 
continuing level of unexplained disappearances in Chechnya.  The case of 
Sadulaeva and several dozen others are examined in the document.  The 
authors, while condemning Chechen rebels for ³unspeakable acts of terrorism,² 
suggest that, ³Russia¹s federal forces, together with pro-Moscow Chechen 
forces, have also committed numerous crimes against civilians, including 
extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention and looting.²  (2) In all, 
monitoring organizations estimate that since 1999 between 3,000 and 5,000 
Chechens have been taken away and never heard from again.   In 2004, both 
pro-Moscow Chechen forces and Human Rights Watch say that the number of 
abductions has not decreased, and may have actually gone up in some areas.  
 
Even more, Human Rights Watch suggests that the latest round of extensive field 
interviews by the organization¹s local representatives uncovered an increasing 
atmosphere of pervasive and crippling fear.  ³It¹s worse than a war,² said a father 
who watched his son summarily executed.  ³During the war, we weren¹t so 
scaredŠ We knew, of course, that we might be hit by a bullet – no one was safe 
from that. But now, how can one sleep through the night?  They wake people, 
take them away, shoot themŠ  I¹m terrified to talk, the prosecutor¹s office is 
terrified – we¹re all scared!  At any moment [the security forces] might come after 
anyone of us.²  (3) 
 
In fact, Human Rights Watch representatives found that, for the first time in four 
years of field visits, many Chechen civilians were too fearful to speak to them.  
³People who have survived the chaos of two wars and actively protested the 
abuses perpetrated in their villages are now too terrified to open the door even to 
their neighbors, let alone to complain,² the authors of the report wrote.  A woman 
searching for her son explained, ³I searched [for him] everywhere, but did not 
write a petition [to the prosecutor]Š Here, many who write petitions [themselves] 
³disappear²Š I was afraid... I have two other sons at home. If I were to tell 
someone, [they] might take them away as well.² (4)  
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This and similar evidence has led Human Rights Watch to call on the 
international community to recognize the situation in Chechnya as a ³crime 
against humanity,² as delineated in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court as well as the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance. (5) Both documents recognize the ³systematic² 
practice of abduction to be a ³crime against humanity.²  In particular, the Rome 
Statute notes that, in order to fit within this category, the disappearances must be 
³committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.² (6)  This definition, say HRW 
and other human rights groups, fits the situation within Chechnya perfectly.   
 
The organization is also calling on the UN Commission for Human Rights to pass 
a strong resolution ³to send the message that Russia¹s continuing practice of 
disappearances will have consequences.²  (7) However, reaction to this report by 
the international community has been muted at best.  In fact, contrary to HRW¹s 
request, for the first time since 1999, the Chechen conflict is not on the agenda of 
the UN Commission for Human Rights annual meeting.  HRW¹s Executive 
Director Rachel Denber calls the decision by the EU not to pursue the case at the 
Commission ³unconscionable.² (8) 
 
It is likely that the EU understands it cannot succeed at the Commission.  For 
three years, resolutions condemning the practice of abduction in Chechnya have 
failed in the face of massive lobbying by Russia.  This lobbying reportedly has 
included threats to increase trade restrictions on European agricultural products 
and possibly increase the cost of the oil and gas Russia provides to the 
continent.  There is no reason to believe the result of a resolution battle this year 
would be any different.  
 
Simply put, world leaders repeatedly have chosen to side with Russia on the 
issue, or at least to calm their consciences by accepting Russia¹s claims that the 
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situation within the republic is improving.    It would appear that Russia¹s trade, 
military and economic position within Europe may outweigh concerns about the 
continuing disappearances in Chechnya.  It would also appear that the 
international community is hesitant to criticize any country for its fight against 
terrorism.  
 
A field researcher who spent two weeks in Chechnya interviewing witnesses for 
the HRW report says the response of the international community shows that 
³Russia has been extremely successful in exploiting the global war on terrorism.²  
However, Anna Neistat suggests, ³Our research shows that the majority of 
people who disappear are civilians.² She says, ³Of course, nobody is challenging 
Russia¹s right to fight against terrorists.²  But, ³I spent two weeks in Chechnya 
interviewing witnesses and I can tell you that most of the people who disappear 
cannot be terrorists.²  She notes that one man who disappeared had been 
severely disabled in a mining accident and had limited mobility.  Further, she said 
Human Rights Watch documented numerous cases of the abduction of women – 
many of whom were mothers with up to eight children and no known connections 
to terrorist activity.  Even more, Neistat notes that under international law, no 
country has the right to ³make people disappear,² particularly with no trial and no 
records.  (9) 
 
Still, it seems unlikely that the international community will come to the defense 
of Chechen civilians.  And this year, that decision likely will resonate much further 
with the segment of Chechen society looking for a way out that does not include 
bombs and abductions.  For the first time, this population is without former 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov.  To the majority of moderate Chechen 
civilians, Maskhadov was their voice, and their one chance at a negotiated 
settlement.  His death, coupled with the rejection of their complaints by the 
international community, has the potential to further alienate this population – 
feeding into a sense of hopelessness and hostility, while perpetrators of violence 
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are emboldened by apparent impunity.  For some, terrorist acts, including the 
targeting of Russian civilians, become more acceptable in this environment.  
 
Therefore, it is more important than ever that the international community be the 
voice of civilians caught up in a cycle of violence.  While continuing to condemn 
the acts of those Chechens who see Russian civilians as acceptable targets, the 
world should also condemn those Russian and pro-Moscow security services 
who use attacks on civilians to create a climate of fear, submissiveness and 
hopelessness.  At this pivotal point in the Chechen conflict, these civilians must 
be provided a voice that is an alternative to violence.  Otherwise, the only sounds 
the international community may hear from them in the future are explosions. 
 
GEORGIA 
Finally, Progress? 
On March 16, Russia made what appeared to be a large concession on the issue 
of the closure of its bases in Georgia.  Speaking to the ITAR-TASS news agency, 
General Alexander Rukshin, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed 
Forces, said Russia would eliminate its bases within four years.  He said, ³This is 
the limit, which we are ready to accept, in order to be able to withdraw from 
Georgia, in a civilized way, all our servicemen, weapons and military hardware.²  
(10)  
 
The statement, which has not been refuted by other Russian officials, came less 
than one week after the Georgian parliament passed a toughly worded resolution 
that could lead to the outlawing of Russia¹s military bases.  The resolution states, 
³In case of failure to reach a bilateral agreement on withdrawal of the military 
bases by May 15, 2005, the Russian side shall be demanded to put an end to the 
existence of Russian military bases on the territory of Georgia by January 1, 
2006.²  Further, ³In case of failure to reach, by May 15, 2005, an agreement with 
the Russian side on the concrete, acceptable for Georgia and reasonable time 
frame for withdrawal of RF's military bases from the territory of Georgia, the 
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Executive Authorities of Georgia shall carry out, in accordance with the law, 
adequate measures with regard to these military bases.²  These listed measures 
include the denial of visas to Russian servicemen, assessment of charges to 
Russia for the costs incurred while supporting the bases, creation of ³special 
regime movements² for Russian troops, and a determination of ecological 
damage done as a result of activities at the bases. (11) 
 
Rukshin attempted to portray his statement not as the concession it was, but as a 
demand.   ³The Georgian parliament may indicate any time limit it wishes, but our 
stand on this problem will be immutable,² he said.  (12) Rukshin did not mention 
that just weeks before, Russian authorities had said it would be impossible to 
withdraw their troops in less than 12 years.  
 
Nevertheless, Georgian officials now express optimism that this issue finally may 
be solved.  Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili confirmed that Russian 
negotiators have suggested a three-four year timeframe for withdrawal of 
Russian troops and armament, and called this solution ³optimal.²  (13) 
 
It remains to be seen, of course, whether a concrete negotiated settlement can 
be developed.  This is largely because the price Russia may attempt to exact for 
the military base agreement is unclear;  Gazprom has stated its desire to own 
Georgia¹s trunk pipeline system, and the country continues to battle with Russia 
over the state of joint border patrols.  Still, Georgia¹s success at moving Russia¹s 
position on this issue should stand as an example to other states or 
organizations currently in negotiations with the country.  Georgia¹s decision to 
take a loud and public stand and not move, even in the face of military, economic 
and political threats, resulted in at least limited success.  It is an important lesson 
that deserves attention.     
 
Source Notes: 
 
 36 
(1) ³Worse Than a War: Disappearances in Chechnya Constitute a Crime 
Against Humanity,² Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Appendix, 12 Mar 05 
via www.hrw.org. 
(2) Ibid.  Executive Summary. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. Background: The Current Situation in Chechnya. 
(5) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
General Assembly Resolution, 47/133, 18 Dec 92, Preamble.  See 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridoca.nsf/.  The declaration is non-binding. 
(6) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Part 2, Article 7, 17 July 
1998.  See http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.  Russia has not ratified 
the Rome Statute. 
(7) Acting Executive Director Rachel Denber.  Press Release, Human Rights 
Watch, 21 Mar 05. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Interview with author, 22 Mar 05. 
(10) ITAR-TASS News Agency, 16 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11)Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on the Military Bases of the Russian 
Federation Located on the Territory of Georgia.  See www.civil.ge for the English 
translation of the entire text. 
(12) ITAR-TASS News Agency, 16 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) RosBusinessConsulting, 18 Mar 05 via www.rbcnews.com. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Elections: The end of Akaev's rule? 
On 27 February and 13 March, Parliamentary elections were held in Kyrgyzstan. 
In the weeks leading up to the polls, it became clear that the ballot would not 
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proceed as smoothly as the Kyrgyz government would wish.  The events in 
Ukraine of last winter have caused reverberations around Central Asia, but 
governmental disquiet has been most visible in Kyrgyzstan. At the international 
level, Akaev directly accused the United States of funding Otunbaeva¹s 
candidacy, and warned the OSCE that interference in the elections would not be 
brooked. But the Kyrgyz government did not help its own cause in seeking to 
forestall unrest. Five days before the election, the printing house of an opposition 
newspaper, Moya stolitsa novosti, experienced a 48 hour power outage. 
 
Pre-election protests were reported in three of Kyrgyzstan's seven oblasts over 
the exclusion of other, less well known opposition candidates. Significant 
numbers were involved in some cases: in Issyk-Kul for example, 2500 people 
blocked a major highway for five days, demanding that former Prime Minister 
Arslanbek Maliev be restored to the ballot. These protests continued to occur in 
various districts until Election Day. Voting on 27 February proved inconclusive: 
only 30 of 75 seats were decided, meaning that a second round, scheduled for 
13 March, would be required. (1) 
 
Initially, the Kyrgyz government must have breathed a sigh of relief: only one 
small protest in Bishkek (led by Otunbaeva) was reported on Election Day, while 
the remainder of the country apparently remained quiet. On 4 March, a series of 
major protests erupted, and the governments' hopes for a quiet inter-round 
period were shattered. 
 
In the Southern city of Jalal-Abad crowds numbering up to 3,000 gathered in the 
main square to protest against election fraud and support the candidacy of local 
opposition figure Jusupbek Bakiev, whose brother Kurmanbek leads the People's 
Movement of Kyrgyzstan—the country's biggest opposition bloc. (2) Protesters 
did not confine themselves to the streets for long; hours after the demonstration 
began crowds occupied the provincial administration building and began to call 
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for the resignation of several senior local officials—as well as that of President 
Akaev himself. (3) 
 
The Jalal-Abad protest seems to have been the catalyst opposition protesters 
needed. Similar actions involving thousands of people began to occur across the 
country, including in Osh, Uzgen, Aravan and Naryn, where, although 
demonstrators were unable to occupy the region's administrative building, they 
were able to surround the edifice and prevent access by blockading surrounding 
highways. (4) 
 
The emergence of multiple protests resulted in a concerted attack by opposition 
leaders and deputies, who on 10 March issued a resolution outside the 
Parliament building in Bishkek, calling for early Presidential elections. Forced to 
meet outside the building (allegedly because of repair work being done) the 
deputies stated that the "president who has publicly spoken in favor of fair 
elections but at the same time has helped disrupt the electionsŠshould no longer 
be the leader of the country." (5) 
 
As with the pre-election protests, the government's reaction has been to both 
dismiss and threaten the demonstrators, with President Akaev claiming that 
unrest had been launched by disenchanted, failed candidates, and Prime 
Minister Nikolai Tanayev stating that agitators would be "brought to account." (6) 
 
It was in this atmosphere of heightened tension, that second round voting took 
place on 13 March. As was to be expected, Bermet Akaeva won her seat by a 
comfortable margin, while preliminary Central Election Commission reports 
showed Pro-Presidential parties winning a two thirds majority (50 of 75 seats) in 
the Parliament. (7) Opposition candidates secured only 5 seats in the new 
legislature. Although the OSCE has yet to publish a full report into the elections, 
the organization noted that many of the violations observed in the first round 
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(publicly acknowledged "vote buying" and "administrative interference") were also 
prevalent in the second round. (8) 
 
Opposition protests continued during the second round, and they have intensified 
in the week since. Many of the cities which witnessed inter-round protests 
reported that demonstrators had occupied additional buildings. (9) But the 
protests have also spread to other areas. Demonstrations were reported in 
Batken and Talas, (10) while in Bazar-Kurgan, protestors stormed government 
offices, and for six hours held hostage Maramarsul Torayev, the district's chief 
administrator. (11) 
 
Surprisingly, it is not Otunbayeva who has emerged as the opposition's rallying 
figure, but Kurmanbek Bakiev, the former Prime Minister  and leader of the 
People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan which is headquartered in Jalal-Abad, who 
has been calling loudest for Akaev's resignation and early Presidential polls. 
Bakiev has insisted that only top-level negotiations between Akaev and the 
opposition leadership will suffice to resolve the situation. (12) 
 
Last weekend, the situation escalated even farther. On Sunday, 10,000 people 
armed with sticks and petrol bombs, stormed Jalal-Abad's main police station. 
Police officers reportedly fired on the protestors (a spokesman insisted that only 
blanks were used), but none were injured. Hours later, the protestors burned 
down the building. No fatalities were reported, although several police officers 
were wounded. (13) 
 
Early on Sunday morning, the government made good on its threats to use 
violence: OMON troops from the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry in Osh and Jalal-Abad 
stormed several buildings controlled by the protestors. The attempt to quell the 
demonstrators was unsuccessful: reports from the region indicate that the crowds 
simply "redeployed" to other areas of the cities, including the suburbs and the 
airport. (14) 
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On 22 March, President Akaev made an announcement, first stating that election 
results which had "sparked strong public reaction" would be reviewed, (15) and 
then offering to hold top level negotiations with opposition leaders. (16) Later the 
same day, it emerged that Prime Minister Tanayev had traveled to Jalal-Abad as 
Akaev's personal representative to begin discussions with protest leaders. (17) 
During the speech in which he offered negotiations, President Akaev also 
categorically ruled out his own resignation, stating that only an election or action 
by the Parliament could legally force his departure. (18) 
 
It seems clear that this position is not viable. A central part of the opposition's 
demands is Akaev's resignation. Although he may be able to remain in his post 
until October, it is difficult, given the scale of protests and the ferocity of anti-
Presidential sentiment, to believe that the opposition will countenance another 
term for the incumbent. It is likely that demonstrations would erupt on a huge 
scale if Akaev were to seek another term. One possible solution for Akaev may 
be to withdraw from the contest himself, and to place all his political and financial 
resources behind a presidential bid for his daughter, who has not been attacked 
directly by the opposition. At this point however, it is too early to predict an 
outcome, and negotiations between the two parties are likely to last some time. 
 
Akaev's rhetoric seems to have been anchored in the fact that the protests had 
been confined to the southern regions of the country—by Wednesday no protests 
had occurred in Bishkek, and no clear opposition leader had emerged. It is now 
clear that Akaev grossly miscalculated the situation. On Thursday morning, mass 
protests erupted in Bishkek. Within a matter of hours, protestors had stormed the 
Presidential compound, taking over the White House (Akaev's residence), as well 
as the country's main government run television station, KyrgyzTV, (19) where 
members of the opposition announced that the government had fallen. With the 
state's protective forces evaporating, President Akaev and his family apparently 
fled the country. (20) 
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While leadership of the disparate opposition forces thus far has been lacking, 
Felix Kulov, the former vice-President, was released from prison, on Thursday 
and began was beginning to coordinate between the various opposition factions. 
(21) Protestors in Bishkek, Osh and Jalal-Abad generally have represented a 
"rainbow" of opposition forces, yet Kulov may prove vital in uniting and stabilizing 
Kyrgyzstan's various opposition voices. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Unified opposition candidate for presidency? 
Several weeks ago, Kazakhstan's major opposition group, Ak Zhol began to 
undergo a major crisis, which came about largely due to the party's election 
failure. (22) Last month, Alikhan Baimenov, co-chairman of the party, called a 
special plenary meeting during which a vote of no confidence was passed 
against Altynbek Sarsenbayev-another of the party's co-chairman. At the heart of 
Baimenov's complaints against Sarsenbayev was Sarsenbayev's betrayal of the 
opposition's cause by serving in President Nursultan Nazarbaev's government 
prior to September's elections and his participation in "coalition talks" with other 
opposition groups, (aimed at agreement on a joint candidate) for next January's 
presidential election.  (23) After the plenum, Baimenov and Sarsenbayev 
continued their war of words, and it seemed likely that Baimenov—who holds the 
Party's sole seat in the Majlis, might be tempted to split from the party. This has 
proven to be the case: during Ak Zhol's 5th Congress, held in Astana, Baimenov 
announced his intention to resign from the party. Interestingly, several delegates 
of the party, including Sarsenbayev, refused to accept Baimenov's resignation. 
(24) 
 
Just days before Baimenov attempted to resign, news emerged which may 
explain the Party's refusal to countenance Baimenov's decision: the Coordinating 
Council of Democratic Forces (the group at the center of Sarsenbayev's 'coalition 
talks') announced that a new movement called For a Just Kazakhstan had been 
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formed. Although not a political party in its own right, this group aims to elect a 
single, unified candidate for next year's Presidential polls. (25)  Ak Zhol is the 
strongest of Kazakhstan's opposition groups. It is possible that the party is now 
attempting to maintain unity, in the hopes that the single candidate will be 
selected from within its own ranks. 
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